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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
awareness of a fundamental right of a shareholder. To protect
this right the Corporation Act does not recognize any power to
change or modify it in the articles or by-laws, and it should logic-
ally follow that it cannot be indirectly abrogated by agreements
with the shareholders.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - CRIMINAL INTENT OR KNOWLEDGE AS AN
ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION UNDER THE
NARCOTICS LAW
In a prosecution for unlawful possession of a hypodermic
syringe and needle, the state introduced in evidence (for the
stated purpose of showing criminal intent and guilty knowledge)
a barbiturate found in the box along with the hypodermic in-
struments. When the defense subsequently attempted to intro-
duce evidence that defendant had never used the hypodermic
instruments for administering narcotics, the prosecution's objec-
tion was sustained on the ground that it was irrelevant and im-
material as defendant was not charged with possession of nar-
cotics. The statute defining the crime of unlawful possession of
hypodermic instruments' makes no mention of any requirement
of criminal intent or knowledge of any particular facts. On ap-
peal, held, conviction reversed. "Unlawful possession" neces-
sarily involves knowledge of the fact that one is possessing un-
lawfully, as well as knowledge of the criminal consequences
which one should reasonably anticipate therefrom. The refusal
of the trial judge to allow defendant to show that he was in "good
faith" and that "his intent was anything but that of violating the
law" deprived the defense of a substantial right. State v. Bird-
sell, 232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957).
Article 11 of the Louisiana Criminal Code provides that "the
definitions of some crimes require a specific criminal intent,
while in others no intent is required," and that "some crimes con-
sist merely of criminal negligence that produces criminal con-
sequences."'2 In those crimes defined in the Criminal Code itself,
the mental element is clearly spelled out. Article 10 of the Code8
declares that criminal intent may be "general" or "specific" and
1. LA. R.S. 40:962 (1950).
2. Id. 14:11.
3. Id. 14:10.
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defines these terms. The substantive articles express whether a
general or a specific intent is required for the crime defined.
For example, simple arson is defined as the "intentional" damag-
ing of the property of another 4 and a general provision 5 declares
that the terms "intent" and "intentional" without qualifying pro-
visions have reference to general criminal intent. In some ar-
ticles knowledge of a particular fact is expressly required as an
element of the crime. Thus, in order to be guilty of the crime of
receiving stolen property one must know or have reason to know
that the property was in fact stolen." However, many criminal
statutes found in the revised statutes do not specify the intent
or knowledge with which the proscribed act must be committed.
The Louisiana Narcotics Act 7 is such a statute. Subsection A of
the act provides that "it is unlawful for any person to ... have
... any narcotic drug, except as provided in this Sub-part." A
possessor of a prohibited article may have any of a number of
possible degrees of criminal intent or guilty knowledge. At one
extreme, he may have no knowledge of the fact of possession at
all. For example, the article might have been slipped into his
pocket by someone without his knowledge. Or, he might be
aware of the fact of possession without being aware of the iden-
tity and nature of the article. This could happen to a person re-
ceiving a narcotic drug from a druggist who has filled the wrong
prescription. Then there is the possibility that a possessor knows
that he possesses the article and is aware of its nature. In the
first two postulates the possessor would obviously have no intent
as to the use of the prohibited article for he is not aware of the
identity and nature of the article. In the last postulate the pos-
sessor may have any of three possible intents as to its use. He
may intend not to use it at all. Or, he may intend to use it but
in a manner other than that expressly or impliedly prohibited
by law. And then, of course, he may intend to use it in a man-
ner which is prohibited.
Despite the fact that no mention of criminal intent or knowl-
edge is contained in the Louisiana narcotics statute, the Supreme
Court held in State v. Nicolosi that one who is ignorant of the
presence of narcotics found in his possession is not guilty of
unlawfully possessing narcotics. In State v. Johnson,9 decided on
4. Id. 14:54.
5. Id. 14:11.
6. Id. 14:11.
7. Id. 40:962.
8. 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955).
9. 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24 (1955), 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIxw 229 (1956).
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the same day as the Nicolosi case, it was held that "guilty knowl-
edge is an essential ingredient of the crime of possession of nar-
cotic drugs."'10 Following the Johnson case there was specula-
tion as to whether the court meant that knowledge of the fact of
possession of the substance would suffice or whether the of-
fender must also know that the substance is a narcotic, in order
to be found guilty."
The instant case deals with Subsection B of the Louisiana
Narcotics Act 2 which makes (with certain provisos and excep-
tions not pertinent to this Note) the possession of a hypodermic
syringe or needle unlawful. The language of the opinion does
not make clear what degree of criminal intent or knowledge the
court deems necessary to constitute this crime. In one part of
the opinion, the court declares that the defendant had a right "to
show that the prohibited articles were in his possession as a
result of mistake, accident, or from his own negligence."' 13 If the
opinion had gone no further than this it would be unclear
whether the court meant that in addition to the obvious require-
ment that he know that he physically possesses the articles the
offender must also know that the items are in fact hypodermic
syringes or needles. However, the court also states that the de-
fendant was entitled to prove his "good faith," that is, he "was
entitled to prove that his intent was anything but that of violat-
ing the law.' 1 4 Taken literally, this language would mean that a
defendant who possesses the prohibited articles, knowing them
to be hypodermic needles or syringes, could nevertheless exoner-
ate himself by showing that he was in "good faith" and had no
intention of "violating the law." Indeed, this would mean that
the state, in order to secure a conviction, would have to prove
that defendant intended to violate the law. The court also speaks
of the requirement of "criminal intent," "guilty knowledge,"
"evil motive," "knowledge that one possesses unlawfully," and
"guilty knowledge of the consequences of the act," and appears
to use these expressions interchangeably. Therefore, while the
precise extent of criminal intent of guilty knowledge which the
court deems necessary is not clear, there can be no doubt that
something more than mere awareness of the fact of possession
of the articles will be required.
10. 228 La. 317, 334, 82 So.2d 24, 30 (1955).
11. Note, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 229 (1956).
12. LA. R.S. 40:962B (1950).
13. State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 731, 95 So.2d 290, 292 (1957).
14. Ibid.
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The broad statement of the court in the instant case that "no
crime can exist without the combination of a criminal act and a
criminal intent"'15 is open to serious question. There is a class
of acts, sometimes referred to as "civil offenses," which are made
criminal without regard to the knowledge or intent of the actor.16
For example, the statute defining unlawful sales to minors ex-
pressly provides that lack of knowledge of the minor's age shall
not be a defense.'7 In a scholarly article Professor Sayre has
traced the development of this field in England and in the United
States.1 8 He lists eight general categories of acts which have be-
come "civil offenses" through the action of legislatures and
courts.' 9 When a statute contains no provision concerning intent
or knowledge, the court must determine whether the act alone
was intended to constitute the crime, or whether there is an im-
plied requirement of criminal intent or guilty knowledge. It has
been suggested 20 that two factors should be considered by the
court in determining the probable intention of the legislature in
such cases. (1) Where the effectiveness of the statute would be
seriously impaired by a requirement of proof that an offender
had knowledge of certain facts or intended to use the prohibited
articles in a particular manner, it is likely that the legislature
did not intend to require such proof. (2) Where the primary
purpose of the statute is to protect society rather than to punish
15. Id. at 730, 95 So.2d 291.
16. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 692 (1957) ; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUm. L. REV. 55 (1933).
17. LA. R.S. 14:91 (1950).
18. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
19. "The offenses not requiring mens rea fall roughly within the following
groups:
(1) Illegal sales of intoxicating liquor;
(a) sales of prohibited beverage;
(b) sales to minors;
(c) sales to habitual drunkards;
(d) sales to Indians [or] other prohibited persons;
(e) sales by methods prohibited by law;
(2) Sales of impure or adulterated food [or] drugs;
(a) sales of adulterated or impure milk;
(b) sales of adulterated butter or oleomargarine;
(3) Sales of misbranded articles;
(4) Violations of anti-narcotic acts;
(5) Criminal nuisances;
(a) annoyances or injuries to the public health, repose or comfort;
(b) obstructions of highways;
(6) Violations of traffic regulations;
(7) Violations of motor-vehicle laws;
(8) Violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health
or well-being of the community."
Professor Sayre documents this outline with extensive citation of cases, id. at 94.
20. PERKINS, CRImiNAL LAW 692 (1957) ; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
CoLum. L. REV. 55 (1955).
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the offender, criminal intent and guilty knowledge have little
relevance to the social evil involved and it is not to be presumed
that the legislature intended to require such a showing. On the
strength of these considerations, it has been suggested 21 that
legislatures enacting narcotics laws usually do not intend to re-
quire proof even of the knowledge that the substance is a nar-
cotic, and the Federal Narcotics Act 2 2 and state statutes" similar
to the Louisiana act have been so interpreted.
If the Louisiana court had taken into account only these two
considerations it obviously would have felt compelled to hold that
knowledge of the fact of possession alone would suffice. How-
ever, the language of the opinion in the instant case rather clear-
ly shows that the court means to require a showing not only of
knowledge of fact of possession and identity but also of an in-
tention to use the hypodermic instruments in an unlawful man-
ner. Although the opinion contains no indication of the under-
lying considerations for the ruling, it is believed that it was in-
fluenced by the extreme severity of the penalties imposed upon
narcotics violators in Louisiana.24 It is submitted that this over-
riding consideration, 25 that of the severity of the penalties, plus
the fact that hypodermic instruments may be put to a great num-
21. Ibid.
22. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
23. State v. Hinkle, 129 W.Va. 393, 41 S.E.2d 107 (1946) ; Devine v. State,
206 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947). See other cases collected in Annotation
in 39 A.L.R. 249.
24. LA. R.S. 40:981 (1950), as amended Acts 1956, No. 84, § 1. The 1956 Act
provides that the penalties shall be as follows:
(1) For conviction of a person over twenty-one of selling, giving, adminis-
tering or delivering a narcotic drug to a person under twenty-one - imprison-
ment at hard labor for not less than thirty years nor more than ninety-nine
years without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence;
(2) For conviction of a person over twenty-one of selling, etc., a narcotic
drug to a person over twenty-one -imprisonment at hard labor for not less
than ten years nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, etc.
(3) For conviction of a person under twenty-one of selling, etc., a narcotic
drug to any person - imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years
nor more than fifteen years without benefit of parole, etc.
(4) For conviction of manufacturing, possessing, or controlling any nar-
cotic drug, or the violation of any other provisions of the statute - imprison-
ment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than fifteen years without
benefit of parole, etc.
The act also contains special provisions for convicted narcotics addicts who are
first offenders.
25. "[S]ome public welfare offenses involve a possible penalty of imprisonment
or heavy fine. In such cases it would seem sounder policy to maintain the orthodox
requirement of a guilty mind but to shift the burden of proof to the shoulders of
the defendant to establish his lack of a guilty intent if he can." Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses. 33 CoLLins. L. REV. 55, 79 (1933). "[Tlhe penalty for a civil
offense should never be severe. The maximum should be a moderate fine or some-
thing of a comparable nature. It should never include imprisonment." PEaaiNs,
CIUMINAL LAW 705 (1957).
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ber of harmless and legitimate uses, justifies a requirement of
proof that hypodermic instruments were intended to be used in a
prohibited manner. The Nicolosi and Johnson cases contain no
indication that in order to be found guilty of unlawful possession
of a narcotic drug the possessor must intend to use the drug at
all. Whether the ruling and the language of the instant case were
intended to apply as well to cases involving possession of nar-
cotic drugs is not clear. As there is very limited legitimate use
to be made of narcotics, it is submitted that the court might very
well intend to draw a distinction between the possession of hypo-
dermic instruments and the possession of narcotics, and in the
latter case to require only a showing that the possessor know
that he possessed a narcotic.
Daniel J. McGee
EVIDENCE - PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - RIGHT OF ACCUSED
TO INSPECT PRIOR STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES
Defendant was convicted in federal district court of falsely
swearing that he was not a Communist. On cross examination
two government witnesses admitted making oral and written re-
ports to the FBI concerning alleged Communist activities of the
defendant. Defendant then moved that the court order produc-
tion of these reports by the government for inspection and use
in impeaching the witnesses. The motion was denied. The court
of appeals upheld this denial on the ground that defendant had
not laid the necessary foundation of inconsistency between the
contents of the reports and the witnesses' testimony. On cer-
tiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and
remanded. A foundation of inconsistency is not required for pro-
duction. It is enough that the specific prior statements, written
or orally made, touch the events and activities about which the
witnesses have testified. Further, the practice of giving docu-
ments to the trial judge for his decision as to their relevancy
without first allowing the defendant to see them and present
arguments for their production is disapproved. Finally, if the
government under a claim of privilege withholds the reports
when ordered to produce them, the criminal action should be dis-
missed. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
In prosecutions involving the question of production by the
government of prior statements of its witnesses, the federal
19581
